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Abstract
Despite the apparent benefits of being mindful, people are often not very mindful. There seem to be forces that drive people
toward as well as away from mindfulness. These forces are conceptualised in terms of competition for scarce attentional
resources. To explore these forces and to test this framework, an experience sampling study was performed among people with
an explicit intention to be mindful and an ongoing practice to examine concurrent associations between state mindfulness and
daily life experiences that may affect it. Participants (N = 29, 1012 observations) filled out questions on momentary experiences
at semi-random intervals, five times a day, over a period of 7 to 10 days. Predictors of within-person variations in awareness of
Present Moment Experience (PME) and non-reactivity to PMEwere examined using multilevel analyses. Participants were more
aware of PMEwhen they had an activated intention to bemindful andwhen they felt good, and not very busy or hurried, and were
not involved in social interaction. They were more reactive to PMEwhen they experienced unpleasant affect, and when theywere
hurried or tired. An activated intention to be mindful was also associated with an increased tendency to analyse PME.
Experiencing threat was associated with increased reactivity, but not with decreased awareness. Our study generally supports
the idea that competition for attention can be a fruitful framework to describe mechanisms behind being or not being mindful.
Keywords Mindfulness . Attention . Intention . Experiential avoidance . Experience sampling
Why are people, even people having an explicit intention to be
mindful, not always mindful? The benefits of mindfulness and
mindfulness training have received ample attention in present-
day psychological research (e.g. Brown et al. 2007; Keng et al.
2011), yet little is known regarding the mechanisms that en-
hance or diminish one’s mindfulness in daily life. Insight into
these mechanisms would not only be theoretically interesting.
It would potentially have applications in further development
of mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs). Such knowledge
could, for example, be used to educate MBI participants,
supporting their intention to be mindful during the day. The
learning processes involved in developing mindfulness could
be explored, facilitating MBI optimisation to maximise learn-
ing and transfer. Besides that, explaining fluctuations in
mindfulness might enhance our general understanding of
mechanisms underlying attention and awareness.
In their operational definition of mindfulness, Bishop et al.
(2004) define mindfulness in terms of not just non-elaborative
awareness of current experience but also Ban orientation of
curiosity, experiential openness and acceptance^ (p. 234).
Being mindful therefore implies attending to present-
moment experience (PME) itself rather than shifting attention
to reactions to PME, such as analysis of its content or attempts
to change PME. Reactions to PME can, of course, themselves
be experienced, and attending to that experience would con-
stitute mindfulness. Building on the definition of Bishop et al.,
two aspects of mindfulness can be distinguished: awareness
(of PME) and non-reactivity, the latter representing the non-
elaborative nature of awareness and an open and accepting
orientation. Thus conceptualised, these two aspects of mind-
fulness are states, not traits.
State non-reactivity should then not be confused with trait
acceptance. The latter, as conceptualised by Cardaciotto et al.
(2008), has been framed, along with similar measures, as
Bwillingness and readiness to expose oneself to experiences,
non-avoidance^ (Bergomi et al. 2013, p. 192). (Trait) accep-
tance may be thought of as the ability and willingness to gen-
erally stay out of (state) reactivity in the face of difficult PME.
* Han Suelmann
hansuelmann@gmail.com
1 Faculteit Psychologie en Onderwijswetenschappen, Open
Universiteit NL, Postbus 2960, 6401DL Heerlen, The Netherlands
2 Interdisciplinary Center Psychopathology and Emotion regulation,




As the concept of attention is crucial to mindfulness, theo-
retical models of attention may help understand why and
when people are mindful or not. The theoretical framework
presented below was inspired by Desimone and Duncan’s
(1995) biased competition model of visual attention, as elab-
orated by Knudsen (2007). This model describes how infor-
mation competes for access to working memory (i.e. for at-
tention). The most salient information Bwins^, which means
that it is attended to. Working memory has some control over
the competition by modulating the sensitivity to certain kinds
of information. Thus, working memory Bbiases^ the competi-
tion, hence the name of the model. The framework presented
below is not limited to visual attention, and rests upon four
principles: (1) competition for attention, (2) partial control
over attention, (3) a preference for pleasant experiences and
(4) a preference for what is perceived as important.
Principle 1 is the existence of a competition for attention.
As it is impossible to attend to everything simultaneously (e.g.
Knudsen 2007; Schneider and Shiffrin 1977), possible objects
of attention compete for allocation of attentional resources.
Such possible objects of attention include various kinds of
PME (such as sensory impressions), as well as, for example,
goal pursuit and thought content. (Distinguishing between at-
tending to the content of thought (i.e. thinking) and attending
to the experience of thought, the former does not qualify as
mindfulness, the latter does.) The strongest competitor Bwins^
the competition. It follows that one’s degree of mindfulness
critically depends on the strength of PME in that competition.
This does not imply that mindfulness is incompatible with
attending to things like work or socialising. Yet, it does seem
to imply that, for example, attending to a deadline can attract
attention so completely that the connection with PME is lost.
The existence of a competition for attentional resources
implies that generic Bbusyness^ (such as doing one’s work
or chores) is associated with decreased awareness. After all,
resources needed to attend to PME are not available when one
is very busy with other tasks that require attention.
Furthermore, the intention to be mindful may be rapidly for-
gotten in demanding situations, just like the intention to per-
form some action may be rapidly forgotten in such circum-
stances (Einstein et al. 2003).
Principle 2 is that attention is partially under (conscious)
control (Knudsen 2007). An activated intention to attend to
some object will increase the likelihood of attending to that
object. One can consciously bring attention to an object, but
objects—especially salient objects, such as the pain when
one’s finger is hit with a hammer—can also attract attention
apart from (or even against) such regulation.
One may thus consciously aim to be mindful. A general
intention to be mindful will not always be on the top of one’s
mind. The level of its activation varies between situations and
will affect one’s degree of mindfulness. The importance of
intention for being mindful has been stressed before by
Shapiro et al. (2006). (They, however, include intention in
their conceptualization of mindfulness, rather than identify
intention as a variable affecting mindfulness.)
Principle 3 is that a pleasant experience is more motivating
to attend to than an unpleasant one. The tendency to avoid
Bproblematic^ experiences has been called experiential
avoidance in the context of psychopathology (Hayes et al.
1996). However, it seems to be relevant outside that context,
and to be Ba basic component of the human condition^ (Hayes
et al. 1996, p. 1155). Pleasant PME is, therefore, more likely
to be attended to than unpleasant PME. Unpleasant experi-
ences may also trigger mental processes searching for ways
to change that experience for the better, such as rumination
and distraction seeking. (In terms of competition for attention,
reactiveness to PME competes with PME itself for attention.)
Consistent with this, unpleasant affect was found, in an exper-
imental setting, to increase the tendency toward mind wander-
ing (Smallwood et al. 2009).
On the level of trait—rather than state—variables, Moore
et al. (2009) found a negative correlation between experiential
avoidance and mindfulness. Several MBIs aim (among other
things) to decrease experiential avoidance, and were indeed
found to do so, with the expected associations between chang-
es in experiential avoidance and changes in mindfulness
(Kearney et al. 2012). Fatigue and loss potential should also
decrease awareness of PME and increase reactivity, because of
their unpleasantness. Apart from being unpleasant, fatigue
may also be associated with a general reduction of attentional
resources, leading to less awareness of PME.
Principle 4 is that attention tends be allocated to things
considered important, in the sense that they have the potential
to bring rewards or threaten to bring about some kind of loss.
A lot of attention research was done in the context of visual
attention, and the effects of rewards have been researched
extensively (Chelazzi et al. 2013). Not only do rewards direct-
ly motivate attention, signals that have been rewarded in the
past can also involuntarily attract attention, even if these sig-
nals are no longer associated with rewards (Chelazzi et al.
2013). Loss potential presumably has at least equally
strong—and probably even stronger—effects, as there is a
large body of evidence showing that humans are
Bprogrammed^ to attend to threats, even more than to rewards
(Baumeister et al. 2001).
This suggests that issues involving loss potential decrease
awareness of PME. This applies, among other things, to things
threatening to go wrong, or being in a hurry to the point of
perceiving a threat of being late. It also suggests that their
inherent unpleasantness will increase reactivity. Social inter-
action may also compete with PME for attention, because of
the strong reward and loss potential associated with it.
The goal of the current study was to test our framework by
examining whether the mechanisms described above are sup-
ported by real-life within-person correlation patterns. Since
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competition for attention occurs between possible objects of
attention that appear at the same moment in time, all
hypothesised effects are (near-) instantaneous. Therefore, the
focus was on examining concurrent associations among state
mindfulness and daily life experiences that may affect it. The
hypotheses to be tested were that (1) individuals are less aware
of PME when they are busy; (2) there is (a) more awareness
and (b) less reactivity when there is an activated intention to be
mindful; (3) there is (a) more awareness and (b) less reactivity
when one’s affect is perceived pleasant; (4) more fatigue is
associated with (a) less awareness and (b) more reactivity; (5)
in situations involving loss potential, there is (a) less aware-
ness and (b) more reactivity; and (6) during social interaction,
there is less awareness.
Method
Participants
Participants of the study were 30 individuals (29 Dutch, 1
Belgian) with meditation experience in traditions related to
and valuing mindfulness, such as vipassana and
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR; Blacker et al.
2009). The inclusion criteria were having an explicit intention
to be mindful, and currently having a meditation practice in a
tradition valuing mindfulness, not necessarily MBSR or
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; see Segal
et al. 2002). We considered an intention to be mindful impor-
tant, because people without a general intention to be mindful
are unlikely to have the activated intention to be mindful that
figures in hypothesis 2. Participants were recruited using sign-
up lists (at vipassana retreats and a mindfulness teachers meet-
ing, N = 11), direct participation requests (aimed at specific
people presumed to satisfy the entry criteria, mainly because
of participation in retreats, MBSR, or mindfulness teacher
training programme, N = 11) and snowballing (N = 8).
Two additional individuals who did not meet the inclusion
criteria were excluded before data were gathered. One other
participant was dropped from the data analyses after data
gathering (see the BResults^ section). Participant demo-
graphics are presented in Table 1, omitting the one dropped
participant.
Procedure
All items, as well as procedures and tools, were tested in a
small pilot study in a convenience sample of five participants;
none of them participated in the main study. Participants were
interviewed to determine how they had interpreted the items.
The items used to assess mindfulness were found to be unsuit-
able to measure state mindfulness. They were therefore re-
placed by a new scale, subjected to further development and
validation steps, as described in more detail in the next sub-
section. No problems surfaced regarding the other items.
Participants were invited to participate in an experience sam-
pling study. Experience sampling has the distinct advantage of
enabling the examination of within-person, across-occasion var-
iation in real life (e.g. Palmier-Claus et al. 2011).
Participants received written instructions and an explana-
tion of the questionnaire items. They were then interviewed to
ascertain that they met the entry criteria and that they under-
stood the instructions and the questionnaire items. They were
explicitly instructed to ask, rather than guess, if there was any
doubt regarding items or procedures during the research peri-
od. The interview was also used to Bsnowball^ for more par-
ticipants, and to gather demographic data, such as age, sex,
meditation experience and current meditation practice.
The experience sampling schedule involved a period of 7 to
10 days, depending on participant preference and willingness.
Five times a day, at semi-random intervals, between 8.45 AM
and 9.45 PM, participants received a signal prompting them to
answer the questions. Participants could either fill out the ques-
tions online on their smartphone or by paper and pencil, depend-
ing on their own preferences and (phone) hardware possession.
Participants in the smartphone group (N = 26) receivedmessages
from the SurveySignal software (Hofmann and Patel 2014) on
their smartphones, prompting them to fill out the questionnaire.
By clicking on a link in the message, participants accessed the
online questionnaire to answer the questions. Participants in the
paper-and-pencil group (N = 3) received SMSs (following semi-
random schedules similar to those of the smartphone group),
prompting the answering of the questions in a paper-and-pencil
format.





Meditation experience (year) 6.8 4.9
Practice (h/week) 4.0 2.4
Reports/participant 34.9 9.1








Total Vipassana and/or MBSR 83%
aBecause some participants reported more than one practice, the numbers
do not add up to the total number of participants
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Participants were not to enter data after more than 15 min
unless they could recall the moment of the signal accurately,
for example when they had noticed the signal but were unable
to answer immediately. Following McCabe et al. (2012), re-
sponses not entered within an hour after the signal were ex-
cluded. However, differing from their approach, such re-
sponses were blocked at the data gathering stage—rather than
sifted out at the time of analysis—for the smartphone group.
Two days after the start of the data collection, participants
were approached to verify that data collection was on the right
track, and to check whether there were issues or questions
(following the recommendations of Palmier-Claus et al.
2011). After the data collection period, participants had a
debriefing interview to identify any issues and to record any
other relevant remarks. Participants were rewarded by provid-
ing them the results and conclusions when the study was fin-
ished. They were also given the opportunity to opt-in for feed-
back regarding their own correlation patterns, though with
caution, and without making any between-participant
comparisons.
Instrument Development and Validation of the Mindfulness
Scales Existing state mindfulness scales were not suitable for
the present study for several reasons. The State MAAS
(Brown and Ryan 2003) is based on a very different concep-
tualisation of mindfulness; it measures general awareness,
rather than awareness of PME, and does not include items
assessing non-reactivity. The Toronto Mindfulness Scale
(TMS) was developed Bin reference to an immediately pre-
ceding mindfulness meditation session^ (p. 1462), and there-
fore, its validity may not be generalizable to mindfulness in
daily life (Lau et al. 2006; see also Thompson and Waltz
2007). The State Mindfulness Scale (SMS; Tanay and
Bernstein 2013) comprises 21 items, and is therefore too long
to be used in experience sampling research.
An attempt to derive a shorter scale from the SMS was
unsuccessful. In the first pilot study with five participants
(none of them participating in the main study), some items
proved very sensitive to circumstances not directly related to
mindfulness. For example, an item intended to measure notic-
ing of bodily sensations proved very sensitive to the presence
of bodily sensations. Furthermore, non-reactivity is not repre-
sented in the SMS, limiting content validity for the purposes
of the present study. Because of these issues with existing
mindfulness scales, we decided to construct a new measure
capturing state awareness of PME and non-reactivity to PME,
suitable for use in experience sampling.
To construct a new questionnaire, a preliminary set of eight
items was created. Because of our conceptualisation of mind-
fulness, the questionnaire covered questions measuring both
awareness and non-reactivity. Two items assessing awareness
were formulated, reflecting awareness of PME and attending
to PME. Six preliminary items were formulated to assess non-
reactivity, reflecting the non-elaborative, open and accepting
orientation to PME. They included various ways of being
reactive (e.g. seeking distraction). Because the items effective-
ly assessed ways of not being mindful, they were all reverse-
coded. The way in which participants comprehend and re-
spond to these items was examined using a method inspired
by Belzer et al. (2013). A convenience sample of 14 partici-
pants (including all five participants of the first pilot)
responded to the new mindfulness items while thinking aloud,
answering the questions as pertaining to the last thing they did
before the interview (which was conducted by phone). They
were instructed to say what they were thinking, describing all
considerations, questions, memories and reasoning that oc-
curred in their minds in response to the items.
Some modifications were made at this stage. The noun
Bexperience^ (Dutch: Bervaring^) was sometimes interpreted
as Bpast experience^, and was therefore eliminated from the
wordings of some items. The item BI am interested in what I
experience^ was dropped because it tended to be interpreted
in terms of active analysis of PME. The item BI am attending
more to my experience itself than to my reactions to that
experience^ was dropped because it led to confusion, espe-
cially among experienced meditators, who felt that this dis-
tinction could not be made. One item was rephrased: BI know
what’s going on inside me^ was replaced by BI am aware of
what’s going on inside me^. The resulting six items were
found to be comprehensible and unambiguous, and were
interpreted as intended.
To investigate the items in an experience sampling setting,
a subsequent second small pilot study (four participants, a
subset of the participants of the first pilot) was performed,
which focused on the mindfulness items. The items were
found to have good interpretability and applicability to real-
life situations, and no further changes were made.
In the final analysis, the item assessing absorption (BI'm so
consumed by one thing that everything else passes me by^)
was dropped because it did not fit well into the factor structure
of the mindfulness scales. The final set of five items (see the
BAppendix^ section) had a factor structure of two factors
(judged by the scree plot), clearly identifiable as awareness
and non-reactivity, with all items loading on the intended
scales. The analysis item (BI am analysing what I experience^)
cross-loaded somewhat on the awareness scale, which makes
sense, as will be discussed below. The final set of items is
listed in the BAppendix^ section.
Measures
Because the participants had to fill out the same questionnaire
many times, the questionnaire had to be short in order to
promote compliance (Palmier-Claus et al. 2011). Therefore,
the constructs were examined with only a few questions.
Moreover, Schimmack and Grob (2000) found that items
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measuring directly constructs such as affect pleasantness and
fatigue have very high factor loadings (0.83–0.90), which in-
dicates that even a single item can measure such a construct in
a fairly accurate way.
Mindfulness: Awareness and Non-Reactivity We aimed to
measure two aspects of mindfulness: awareness and non-
reactivity. Awareness was measured with two items (example:
BI am aware of what goes on inside me^), α = 0.87. Non-
reactivity was measured with three items (example: BI resist
what I am experiencing^, reverse coded), α = 0.75 (see the
BAppendix^ section).
Activated Intention to Be Mindful Activated intention to be
mindful was measured with three items, pertaining to situa-
tional cues, momentary awareness of intention and trying to
be mindful, respectively (α = 0.80). Example: BI am trying to
be mindful right now .^
Loss Potential Three items were constructed to measure loss
potential. As discussed below, analyses showed that the three
items had quite different correlation patterns. Consequently,
the scale was split into two scales, named Bhurry^ (single
item: BI’m at risk of being late.^ and Bthreat^ (two items,
example: BSomething is threatening to go wrong.^), α = 0.76.
Social Interaction Social interaction was measured with two
items, assessing being with others and communicating with
others, respectively, α = 0.80. (Example: BI am alone^, re-
verse scored.)
Fatigue Fatigue was measured with a single item: BI am tired^.
Affect Valence Affect valence was measured with a single
item: BI feel good^.
Busyness Busyness was measured with a single item: BI am
very busy .^
Except for the items assessing social interaction, 5-point
Likert scales were used, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (fully).
The items assessing social interaction were rated on a three-
point scale, anchored BNo^, BMore or less^ and BYes^, scored
1, 3 and 5, respectively, to have consistent ranges for all items
in the questionnaire. Scale scores were computed by averag-
ing item scores. The items that were used in the questionnaire
were in Dutch and are listed in the BAppendix^ section. The
English translations of the items have not been validated for
use in questionnaires.
Data Analyses
The data have a hierarchical structure, with reports (level 1)
clustered within participants (level 2). Multilevel regression
analysis takes this structure into account (e.g. De Leeuw and
Meijer 2008). Multilevel restricted maximum likelihood re-
gression analyses were performed using the lmer function
of the R package lme4 (version 1.1-7; Bates et al. 2015).
Several multilevel regression analyses were performed.
First, to examine each variable’s relationship with mindful-
ness, a series of univariable multilevel analyses were per-
formed with each individual variable separately as a predictor,
and awareness or non-reactivity as the outcome. The indepen-
dent variables were the ones specified in the hypotheses.
Second, we performed a series of multivariable multilevel
analyses in which predictors of mindfulness were entered si-
multaneously. To account for a possible effect of awareness on
non-reactivity, awareness was included as a predictor in the
multivariable multilevel analysis of non-reactivity.
Additionally, multilevel analyses were performed to verify
the effects of predictors on each other that were mentioned
in the introduction (e.g. threat, being unpleasant, leading to
decreased affect valence).
Standard deviations, correlation coefficients and Cronbach
alphas were computed after centring around participant
means. This ensures that between-participant variance is
removed.
Because we expected that all hypothesised effects are
(near-) instantaneous, only concurrent and no time-lagged as-
sociations were examined. We expected mindfulness levels to
vary rather quickly, and computed lagged correlations to ver-
ify this.
Random effects were initially included for all independent
variables, thus allowing the relationships between variables to
vary between participants. The purpose of this was to ensure
accurate prediction of average effects. The random effect of
hurry on non-reactivity was omitted because it caused conver-
gence problems, because the effect was small and because
adding the random effect did not improve model fit according
to Akaike’s (1973) information criterion.
All planned hypothesis tests were one-tailed, α = 0.05. All
reported p values are one-tailed, unless stated otherwise. If, in
a report, a single item was missing from a scale consisting of
more than two items, the scale score was still computed as the
mean of the available items. All analyses were then performed
on an available-case basis and missing data were not imputed.
The multilevel analyses are based on maximum likelihood
methods that rely on normality and homoscedasticity assump-
tions (Van der Leeden et al. 2008). To check for problems
caused by possible violations of these assumptions and pre-
vent inflated type-1 error rates, we performed case resampling
bootstrap analyses of the multilevel multiple regressions with
awareness and non-reactivity as dependent variables. Bias-
corrected confidence intervals and significance levels for cor-
relations were estimated by a case resampling bootstrap at
participant level, creating 10,000 resampled datasets for each
analysis. Bootstrap methods may yield unbiased estimates of
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standard errors when maximum likelihood methods do not
(Van der Leeden et al. 2008). Similar to the main analyses,
random effects were originally included for all independent
variables. To remedy problems regarding convergence and
performance, all random effects that did not improve model
fit according to Akaike’s information criterion were removed
from the bootstrap computations.
As there were no trends apparent in the data, we did not
remove linear trends from the data.
Results
Data Cleaning, Preparation and Characteristics
One participant from the paper-and-pencil group produced
answers that generally seemed erratic. The numbers of signals
per day were inconsistent with the signals that were actually
sent. The participant cancelled the debriefing and did not re-
spond to subsequent attempts to contact her. Her data were
therefore excluded from the analysis.
During the debriefing, it became clear that one participant
misinterpreted two items of the awareness scale and one par-
ticipant misinterpreted one item of the activated intention
scale; these were treated as missing data for these participants.
Overall, 0.5% of the data was missing at item level and 0.4%
at variable level in the available reports. In total, 1012 reports
were available for analysis (response rate 79%).
Median response time was 3 min; 69% of the answered
(smartphone) signals were answered within 15 min. A com-
parison of quick answers (within 15 min) with slow answers
(not within 15 min) yielded no statistically significant differ-
ences in the correlation coefficients of both mindfulness di-
mensions with their predictors, χ2(14) = 12.1, p = 0.60.
The means and standard deviations of the variables under
study are presented in Table 2. As is evident from Table 2,
some of the variables have skewed distributions. In particular,
participants reported on average low levels of hurry and threat,
close to the minimum values.
Predictors of Awareness and Reactivity
The results of the univariable multilevel analyses predicting
either awareness or non-reactivity are presented in Table 3.
The results of the multivariable multilevel analyses are
depicted in Fig. 1.
As hypothesised (Hypothesis 1), people were less aware
when they were very busy. This was shown both in the
univariable analysis and in the multivariable analysis.
As predicted (Hypothesis 2a), people were more aware of
PME when they had an activated intention to be mindful. In
terms of regression coefficients, this is the strongest relation-
ship that was found.
In contrast with our expectations (Hypothesis 2b), having
an activated intention was not associated with non-reactivity.
To examine this further, separate regression analyses of the
individual items of non-reactivity were performed. Activated
intention to be mindful was associated with increased analysis
of PME, B = 0.189, SE = 0.059, p < 0.01 in a univariable mul-
tilevel regression; for the other two non-reactivity items, no
significant relationship was found. To explore the possibility
that the increased analysis of PME was associated with in-
creased awareness of PME, the analysis was repeated, includ-
ing awareness as an additional predictor. This indeed reduced
the association between activated intention to be mindful and
increased analysis of PME to being statistically non-signifi-
cant, B = 0.089, SE = 0.056, p (two-tailed) = 0.12.
As predicted (Hypothesis 3), people tended to be more
aware and less reactive when feeling good. Both effects are
evident in the univariable analysis and the multivariable
analysis.
In the univariable as well as the multivariable analyses, the
association between fatigue and awareness was negative, as
expected (Hypothesis 4a), but did not reach statistical signif-
icance. As predicted, fatigue was associated with increased
reactivity to PME (Hypothesis 4b).
The associations of hurry and threat were not as simple as
suggested by Hypothesis 5. Hurry and threat were differently
associated with awareness and non-reactivity. Being in a hurry
was associated with lower levels of awareness of PME, but the
association with non-reactivity to PME was rather weak (see
Table 3 and Fig. 1). In contrast to this, threat was not associ-
ated with awareness in the univariable analysis (Table 3) and
was positively associated with awareness in the multivariable
analysis (Fig. 1). Also, threat had a strong negative association
with non-reactivity in both the univariable and multivariable
analyses.
When people were in social interaction, they were less
aware of their present moment experience, as predicted
(Hypothesis 6), controlling for other predictors (Fig. 1). The
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Within-person SD Total SD
Awareness 3.11 0.87 0.93
Non-reactivity 4.37 0.62 0.79
Activated intention 2.70 0.91 1.15
Hurry 1.33 0.72 0.81
Threat 1.23 0.59 0.66
Social interaction 3.30 1.59 1.68
Affect valence 3.27 0.83 1.06
Fatigue 2.74 0.94 1.23
Busyness 2.85 1.10 1.27
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univariable regression yielded a relationship of essentially the
same strength, though in that analysis, the association was not
statistically significant.
Bootstrap Analyses
The bootstrap analyses, each keeping 10,000 resampled
datasets with good convergence, yielded results similar to
the original multilevel analyses. The same regression coeffi-
cients were significant as in the multilevel regression analyses.
This was true for the multiple regression analyses of aware-
ness as well as non-reactivity.
Relationships Among Predictors
Additional multilevel analyses were performed to examine
relationships between predictors. The results are included in
Fig. 1. To verify that hurry, fatigue and threat tend to be ex-
perienced as unpleasant, a multilevel regression analysis was
performed with these three variables as predictors, and affect
valence as the outcome. All three variables were indeed found
Table 3 Results of the
univariable multilevel analyses:
individual predictors of
awareness (N = 28) and
non-reactivity (N = 29)
Awareness Non-reactivity
B SE p B SE p
Activated intention 0.472 0.055 0.000 − 0.062 0.044 0.079
Hurry − 0.208 0.059 0.000 − 0.085 0.036 0.008
Threat 0.037 0.085 0.332 − 0.449 0.072 0.000
Social interaction − 0.031 0.024 0.095
Affect valence 0.177 0.066 0.004 0.282 0.048 0.000
Fatigue − 0.062 0.041 0.067 − 0.135 0.030 0.000
Busy − 0.179 0.039 0.000
Awareness − 0.082 0.024 0.000
All significance levels are one-tailed
B = unstandardized regression coefficient, SE = standard error






















p < 0.05 represented by solid
lines, those having p > 0.05 by
dashed lines
to be negatively associated with affect valence. The relation-
ship of threat with affect valence was much stronger than that
of hurry.
Furthermore, a regression analysis with busyness as predic-
tor and activated intention to be mindful as outcome was per-
formed. The expected negative association was indeed found.
Affect Valence
The predicted relationship between affect valence and
awareness, though in the expected direction and statistical-
ly significant, was somewhat smaller than expected. This
raised the suspicion that it may be smaller because partic-
ipants who are avoiding an unpleasant feeling are unlikely
to report (or even notice) that feeling. To explore this pos-
sibility, a subset of the data was created, containing the
data of only the experienced meditators. BExperienced^
was operationalised as having at least 3 years of meditation
experience, having a current practice of at least 3 h a week
and having silent retreat experience. The reasoning behind
this was that these indicators signal intensive practice, as-
sociated with a more developed ability to detect Bhidden^
feelings. Eighteen participants fulfilled these criteria. The
hypothesis was that experienced meditators would be more
able to detect repressed unpleasant affect while filling out
the questionnaire, thus avoiding the attenuation of the re-
lationship between affect valence and awareness. Indeed,
for experienced meditators, there was a considerably stron-
ger association between affect valence and awareness (B =
0.162, SE 0.045, p < 0.01) compared with less experienced
meditators (B = − 0.040, SE 0.059, p = 0.25). The differ-
ence is statistically significant (ΔB = 0.202, SE 0.074,
p < 0.01).
Mindfulness Levels in Consecutive Reports
Changes in mindfulness levels were quick; mindfulness levels
in one report were hardly correlated with mindfulness levels in
the next report on the same day (for the same participant), r2 =
0.015 for awareness and r2 = 0.030 for non-reactivity, indicat-
ing that no more than 3% of the variance is explained by the
previous report.
Discussion
This study focused on explaining within-person variations in
awareness of Present Moment Experiences (PME) and non-
reactivity to PME. Associations between variations in mo-
mentary mindfulness and other variables throughout the day
were examined. Generally speaking, real-life momentary
mindfulness levels indeed varied in a way that is consistent
with the proposed principles.
Our results support the prediction that people would be less
aware of PME when they are very busy (Hypothesis 1). This
was the most direct prediction following from competition for
attention (Principle 1); it therefore provides a direct corrobo-
ration of our theoretical framework.
Having an activated intention to be mindful was associated
with increased awareness of PME (Hypothesis 2a), corre-
sponding with the principle that attention is partially under
conscious control. In contrast with our expectations, an acti-
vated intention to be mindful is associated with increased
analysis of PME, which is a form of reactivity to PME. A
plausible explanation for this finding is that awareness of
PME is necessary in order to analyse it. If the intention to be
mindful increases awareness, it thereby facilitates analysis of
PME, a possibility also suggested by the cross-loading of the
analysis item (of the non-reactivity scale) on the awareness
factor. This explanation is supported by the finding that the
association between having an activated intention to be mind-
ful and non-reactivity is non-significant in the multivariable
analysis, where awareness is also included as a predictor.
Third, pleasant feelings were hypothesised to increase
awareness and decrease reactivity. The results showed that
participants were indeed more aware and less reactive when
they felt good (Hypotheses 3a and 3b). This is consistent with
the results of Brown and Ryan (2003), who found that affect
was positively associated with mindfulness both between and
within subjects.
Participants were less aware when they were tired
(Hypothesis 4a). However, the relationship between fatigue
and awareness was only marginally statistically significant.
Participants also reported higher levels of reactivity to PME
when they were more tired, as expected (Hypothesis 4b).
Considering the strong relationship between fatigue and affect
valence, it seems plausible that individuals react to fatigue
because it they experience it as being unpleasant.
Regarding Hypothesis 5 (the effect of loss potential), the
results suggest that hurry and threat have markedly different
effects. Being in a hurry was associated with reduced present
moment awareness. This association may arise because hurry,
which is often associated with a need for immediate action,
reduces mindfulness by competing for attention. Threat, on
the other hand, was mainly associated with increased reactiv-
ity. This may be caused by threat being an unpleasant experi-
ence. The difference in the effects of hurry and threat is con-
sistent with our finding that affect valence has a stronger rela-
tionship with threat than with hurry. The difference is also
consistent with the examples participants gave of typical situ-
ations in which they experienced hurry or threat. These exam-
ples mostly implied that hurry required immediate action,
such as needing to arrive in time or getting a job done quickly.
For threat, participants mostly described unpleasant situations
beyond their immediate control, such as interpersonal issues
or impending lack of income.
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Threat, by itself, was not associated with awareness.
However, when analysed alongside our other predictors, it
was associated with increased awareness, instead of decreased
awareness. The difference between the univariable and multi-
variable analyses may arise because when threat and affect
valence are entered into the same regression analysis, any
effect of threat mediated by affect valence is absorbed into
the regression coefficient of affect valence, and only a direct
effect remains. It is possible that our participants, intending to
be mindful and practicing to that end, may have developed a
Breflex^ to be aware of PME when difficulties arise.
Unfortunately, this speculation could not be tested with our
dataset. Our findings do not imply that threat increases mind-
fulness; on the contrary, threat is strongly associated with in-
creased reactivity to PME.
Participants were less aware when they were involved in
social interaction (Hypothesis 6). This corroborates the pre-
diction that, because social interaction is demanding and as-
sociated with considerable reward/loss potential, it claims
scarce attentional resources, diminishing awareness of PME.
The effect was, however, rather weak. It is not clear to what
extent our participants’ social interactions differ from those of
the general population or how this effect size generalises to the
general population. Plausibly, our selected group may have
more Bmindful^ contacts, reducing the tendency of their social
interactions to decrease mindfulness.
An interesting question is whether the statistical relation-
ships reflect causal effects on awareness and reactivity. Our
findings corroborate the hypothesised causal effects in a lim-
ited sense, as they generally support the testable hypotheses
derived from them, but the possibility that mindfulness affect-
ed the predictors under study, rather than the other way
around, cannot be excluded. The associations under study
were concurrent associations, and therefore do not contain
information on the direction of the effects.
The question of causality is especially pertinent with re-
spect to the effect of affect valence on mindfulness. Previous
findings suggest that mindfulness and affect valence influence
one another mutually (Gotink et al. 2016; Snippe et al. 2015).
An experience sampling study by Gotink et al. (2016) sup-
ports our hypothesis that affect valence influences state mind-
fulness as they found that momentary affect predicted mind-
fulness at a later moment. (Their mean time between measure-
ments is smaller in their study than ours, enabling them to find
such relationships.) Consistent with our findings, Gotink et al.
also found that mindfulness was correlated with concurrent
affect, showing a positive correlation with positive affect
and a negative correlation with negative affect.
In contrast, Snippe et al. (2015) did not find evidence for a
lagged effect of negative and positive affect on mindfulness.
However, due to their long time lag (1 day), they may have
missed within-day lagged effects of affect on mindfulness.
Furthermore, they did not measure non-reactivity, and the
current study showed especially strong associations between
affect valence and non-reactivity. The results of Snippe et al.
(2015) supported an effect in the opposite direction by show-
ing that increases in daily mindfulness were followed by lower
levels of negative affect and higher levels of positive affect the
next day.
Limitations
The sample in this study was a selected group, consisting of
individuals with an explicit intention to be mindful and with
meditation experience. Though not all participants were cur-
rently practicing MBSR/MBCT and/or vipassana, the large
majority did. Because of this selection, the results may not
generalise to the general population. Future studies may ad-
dress the applicability of the framework of competition for
attention in individuals without intention to be mindful or
meditation experience. It may well apply to individuals
intending to be mindful, but with no—or less—meditation
experience. It seems unlikely, however, that the presence of
an activated intention to be mindful is a major factor in indi-
viduals not intending to be mindful. It seems likely that, with-
out the driving force of intention, there will not be much
mindfulness at all, and even if there is, it will not be
sustained for long. It is in this sense that we agree with
Shapiro et al. (2006) that intention to be mindful can be
regarded as a crucial component of mindfulness.
Other limitations apply to the measurement of variables.
The research is based on self-report, and experience sampling
severely restricts the number of items in the questionnaire.
The mindfulness items that were used in the questionnaire
do not capture subtle nuances such as mindful observation
of reactivity, reducing content validity somewhat. On the other
hand, existing (trait) mindfulness scales have been criticised
because of issues regarding differential understanding of items
(e.g. Grossman 2011). The use of experience sampling re-
duces such issues, because our analyses are based on within-
participant, rather than between-participant variance.
Furthermore, the way in which the items were understood
was validated before the main study, and participants were
given explanations and ample opportunity to ask questions.
A limitation inextricably connected with experience sam-
pling is that what remains unconscious tends to go unnoticed
(and unreported). The decision to specifically study partici-
pants practicing to be mindful, supposedly being relatively
aware, was intended to counter that limitation.
Another limitation of the study is, as touched upon earlier,
that inferences about the direction of the associations cannot
be made, as concurrent associations were examined.
However, as the hypotheses suggest that the experiences
would have an almost instant effect on mindfulness, examin-
ing time-lagged associations would not solve this issue.
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Furthermore, our data on threat may have mainly reflected
situations in which the threat was relatively obvious, hence the
low average of loss potential, though the latter could also be
explained by threat (and hurry) being relatively rare).
However, the items had sufficient within-person variance to
be able to find relationships.
Future Research
Questions regarding mechanisms affecting state mindful-
ness have not been explored much; thus, numerous issues
still need to be investigated. First, there is no reason to
presume that the proposed principles provide a complete
description of the relevant mechanisms. Future research
may identify other mechanisms affecting mindfulness.
For example, the present study is limited to variables
exhibiting considerable variance over a period of (at
most) 10 days. Thus, factors such as long-term learning
and habit formation could not be detected, nor have they
been elaborated on in the proposed theoretical frame-
work. Put differently, changes in trait mindfulness
(viewed as time-averaged state mindfulness) could not
be detected. Given the propensity of the human brain to
learn by forming habits (e.g. Wood and Neal 2007), it is
plausible that competition for attention and being mindful
will also be heavily influenced by habit formation.
Furthermore, the present study addressed the effects of
loss potential. However, our framework also predicts that
reward potential affects mindfulness. Future studies may
address this.
Second, the importance of an activated intention to be
mindful demonstrates the importance of intention to be
mindful per se. Therefore, in-depth research on the deter-
minants of intention to be mindful is warranted. The
Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen 1991; Ajzen and
Fishbein 1980) could be a fruitful starting point for this
type of research. Furthermore, the importance of having
an intention to be mindful suggests that MBIs might ben-
efit from aiming at developing and sustaining that inten-
tion. The development of such an intention is, of course,
not foreign to MBIs in their current form, but putting
more effort into supporting participants in their intention
to be mindful, may enhance this crucial ingredient of the
development of mindfulness. Future research may aim at
finding effective ways to do this.
Third, affect was simplified to a single-item, one-
dimensional construct (i.e. its valence). Yet, affect has
been found to have two (e.g. Watson and Tellegen 1985)
or even more (Gilbert et al. 2008; Schimmack and Grob
2000) dimensions. It is not a priori clear that all these
dimensions should have identical relationships with mind-
fulness. As an example, the factor labelled Bactivated pos-
itive affect^ by Gilbert et al. may be associated with
reward pursuit. Signalling this, two of the items that make
up this factor are Bexcited^ and Beager .^ Theoretically,
reward pursuit is expected to decrease mindfulness.
Such nuances were not measured in the present study,
but could be examined in future studies measuring affect
in a more detailed way.
Fourth, future research may explore the relationship
with Self-Determination Theory (e.g. Ryan and Deci
2002). That theory assumes that there are basic psycho-
logical needs, and that their fulfilment is important.
Olafsen (2017) hypothesised that insufficient need satis-
faction may therefore cause the mind to wander to causes
and/or solutions for the dissatisfaction, thereby reducing
mindfulness. Her reasoning seems to fit well within a
framework regarding competition for attention. She found
that need support at work and need satisfaction are indeed
associated with increased mindfulness. In a similar vein, a
lack of need fulfilment in general might be associated
with being less mindful.
Fifth, the results suggest that specific factors (busyness,
social interaction, threat, hurry, unpleasant affect) are espe-
cially challenging for someone trying to be mindful. This
suggests that specifically practising under these difficult
circumstances could optimise transfer of what has been
learned to daily life.
To remind participants of their intention to be mind-
ful and to practice at moments that being mindful is
especially challenging, the BStop, Breathe and Be^ ex-
ercise of the .b (Bdot-be^) MBI for adolescents (Burnett
et al. 2011) might be helpful. It involves participants
sending each other short text messages at random mo-
ments, which then trigger the recipient to do a short
meditative exercise (S. Hennelly, personal communica-
tion, Oct. 25, 2016). This reminds the recipient of the
intention to be mindful, and promotes practicing at ran-
dom moments, including difficult circumstances as well.
Otherwise, attempts to be mindful may well be more or
less limited to convenient, relatively easy, circumstances.
This is borne out both by the (negative) association between
busyness and activated intention to be mindful, as found in the
present study, and Einstein et al.’s (2003) finding that
Bforgetting intentions in demanding situations is rapid^. The
effects of this exercise—or similar ones—may be verified in
future research.
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Appendix
Experience Sampling Questionnaire Items
A1 Ik ben me bewust van wat er in me omgaat. (I am
aware of what goes on inside me.)
A2 Ik heb aandacht voor wat ik ervaar. (I pay attention to
what I am experiencing.)
N1 Ik verzet me tegen wat ik ervaar. (I resist to what I am
experiencing.)
N2 Ik zoek afleiding. (I look for distractions.)
N3 Ik ben mijn ervaring aan het analyseren. (I’m
analysing my experiences.)
I1 Ik ben me bewust van mijn intentie mindful te zijn. (I
am aware of my intention to be mindful.)
I2 Ik probeer nu mindful te zijn. (I am trying to be mind-
ful right now.)
I3 De situatie herinnert me aan mijn intentie mindful te
zijn. (The situation reminds me of my intention to be
mindful.)
L1 Ik dreig te laat te zijn. (I am at risk of being late.)
L2 Er dreigt iets mis te gaan. (Something is threatening to
go wrong.)
L3 Er dreigt iets akeligs te gebeuren. (Something nasty is
threatening to happen.)
P1 Ik voel me prettig. (I feel good.)
F1 Ik ben moe. (I am tired.)
B1 Ik ben druk bezig. (I am very busy.)
S1 Ik communiceer met anderen. (I am communicating
with others.)
S2 Ik ben alleen. (I am alone.)
Items A* make up the awareness scale. Item N* make up
the non-reactivity scale. Items I* make up the activated
intention scale. Items L* make up the Loss Potential scales
(L1 = hurry; L2 and L3 = threat). Items S* make up the Social
interaction scale. P1, F1 and B1 assess affect valence, fatigue
and busyness, respectively.
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